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Abstract
In recent applications of discrete choice models of labour supply con-
siderable attention has been devoted to strategies to increase the flexibil-
ity of models for a better fit to the data. These include the introduction
of random parameters, fixed cost of work or flexible functional forms of
preferences. Based on estimates of models of recent studies this paper
compares these different modeling strategies. Results for Swiss data show
that the traditional way to interpret fixed cost of work is ad hoc. Fur-
thermore our results indicate that care should be taken when using very
general function forms of preferences.
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thank Robert Leu, Christian Rütschi and the participants of IZA summer school 2005 for
useful comments. Some of the models are estimated with Biogeme which is provided for free
by Michel Bierlaire.
1
1 Introduction
Over the last decade the discrete choice approach of labour supply analytics
gained more and more popularity in assessing the impact of public policies
on work incentives. The approach can easily handle non-linear and possibly
non-convex budget sets caused by taxation. In addition it avoids the MaCurdy,
Green, and Paarsch (1990) critique that coherency of the model implicitly limits
the range of elasticities that can be obtained.
Recent studies of discrete labour supply focused very much on improving the
models capability in explaining the peaks in the hours distribution. This was
done by gaining flexibility through the introduction of random parameters, state
specific constants or fixed cost of work (see for example (Van Soest 1995)). More
recently flexibility of the models was further increased by allowing for broader
functional forms of preferences. Discrete choice analytics does not need explicit
expressions for both the direct utility function and the labour supply function
(or the indirect utility or expenditure function) and therefore very general func-
tional forms of preferences are principally possible. The move to more general
preferences is also motivated by the repeated rejection of restrictions usually
imposed on household preferences in the standard approach
The present paper compares different discrete modeling strategies used in
recent studies and tries to assess the value of the various model extensions made
to gain flexibility. We start with a basic structural model with a quadratic
direct utility function and then extend it by allowing for fixed costs of work
and unobserved individual preference heterogeneity. This model similar to the
one of Van Soest (1995) or Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) can
be seen as the standard model used in policy analysis. We then move on to
models with more flexible functional forms of preferences. These flexible models
are taken from two recent contributions, one by Van Soest, Das, and Gong
(2002) and the other by Bargain (2004). In the framework of Van Soest, Das
and Gong the direct utility function is approximated by a nonparametric series
approximation in hours and income. In this way they introduce a structural
nonparametric labour supply model which can be used for all sorts of policy
analysis. Bargain suggests two generalizations of the structural model that are
more radical. In the first suggestion preference parameters are allowed to be
alternative specific, that is utility can depend on disposable income in a fully
flexible way over working hours. The second generalization allows the utility
of each alternative to depend on disposable income as well as on wage rates
and non-labour income. In some sense then preferences are price and income
dependent and do not verify the restrictions normally imposed on household
preferences in the standard approach.
The models are estimated with data from the Swiss Income and Expenditure
Survey 1998 (SIES) using simulated maximum likelihood. The model evaluation
is mainly based on three criteria: explanatory power, usability in simulation
exercises and economic foundation. Based on the estimates of the models that
perform best with respect to these criteria we simulate the female labour supply
effects of the introduction of a individual tax system in Switzerland.
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the random
utility models (RUMs) used in this paper to represent utility maximizing dis-
crete choices. Section 3 introduces the different modeling strategies and model
specifications. In section 4 the empirical results concerning the performance of
the various models and the simulation exercises are presented and discussed.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Logit Models for Multiple Choices
In discrete choice labour supply modeling the labour supply decision is described
as the utility maximizing choice between discrete hours alternatives. A promi-
nent way to model utility maximizing discrete choices are random utility models
(RUMs). They are the basis of all the choice models used in this paper and can
be derived as following.1 A decision maker i faces a choice among J alterna-
tives. Each alternative provides a certain level of utility. From alternative J
the decision maker obtains utility Uij , j = 1, ..., J . Alternative j is chosen if
Uij > Uik for all k 6= j. The decision maker’s utility can be decomposed as
Uij = Vij + εij , (1)
where Vij is a function which relates observed factors to the decision maker’s
utility. These factors are attributes of the alternatives, Xij ∀j, and some at-
tributes of the decision maker, Si. Vij depends on unknown parameters βj which
have to be estimated. The function is denoted Vij = V (Xij ; Si, βj) ∀j and is
called representative utility. Factors that are not included in Vij but affect util-
ity are captured by εij . This part of the utility is unknown and assumed to be
random. It can be seen as the error made in evaluating alternative j. Since εij
is simply the difference between Uij and Vij this decomposition is completely
general.
The logit model is obtained by assuming that each εij is independently,
identically distributed extreme value. The density and cumulative distribution
of εij are respectively
f(εij) = e−εij e−e
εij
and
F (εij) = e−e
−εij
.
Mc Fadden (1974) has proved that under this assumption the probability that
decision maker i chooses alternative k is
Pij = Prob(Vik + εik > Vij + εij ∀k 6= j)
=
eVij∑
k e
Vik
. (2)
1See Train (2003) for an excellent overview.
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Representative utility can either be specified to be linear or nonlinear in para-
meters. If parameters enter representative utility nonlinearly estimation is more
difficult because the log-likelihood function may not be globally concave.
Since the logit probabilities take a closed form, the traditional maximum-
likelihood procedures can be applied. The log-likelihood function is given by
LnL(βj) =
I∑
i=1
∑
i
dij lnPij , (3)
where dij = 1 if person i chose j and zero otherwise. The simplicity of the logit
model is a strong advantage. But logit models have some clear limitations. They
can only represent systematic taste variation but not random taste variation and
they imply proportional substitution across alternatives, that is logit models
exhibit the IIA property. One model that obviates these disadvantages is the
mixed logit model (Brownstone and Train 1998, McFadden and Train 2000).
The mixed logit choice probability can be derived in several ways from utility
maximizing behavior. The following derivation is based on the random coeffi-
cient interpretation (Revelt and Train 1998).2 The utility of person i from
alternativ j is given by
Uij = Vij + εij = V (Xij ;Si, βi) + εij , (4)
where Xij , Si and εij are defined as before and βi is a vector of coefficients for
person i.3 If utility is linear in βi and we abstract from Si utility can be written
as Uij = β′ixij + εij . This specification is the same as for logit, except that now
the coefficients βi vary randomly over the decision maker rather than being fixed.
The coefficient vector for each decision maker can be expressed as the sum of
the mean, b, and individual deviation, ηi. Utility is then Uij = b′xij +η′ixij +εij .
The unobserved portion of utility is η′ixij + εij . This term is correlated over
alternatives due to the common ηi. Because of this correlation, mixed logit does
not exhibit the independence from irrelevant alternatives property.4 If we knew
the decision maker’s taste, that is, if we knew the value of βi the conditional
choice probability would be standard logit since εij ’s are iid extreme value, that
is
Lij(βi) =
eVij(βi)∑J
k=1 Vik(βi)
.
2An other popular interpretation is based on error components. But since here the stress
is more on individual taste variation and less on substitution patterns the random coefficient
interpretation seems more natural.
3For notational simplicity we use here βi instead of βij . However it is no problem to
generalize mixed logit to allow for alternative specific random coefficients. In order to avoid
the IAA property either the variance of these random coefficients has to be the same for all
alternatives or the random coefficients are allowed to be correlated over alternatives.
4Mixed logit allow for very general patterns of correlation and hence very general patterns
of substitution. McFadden and Train (2000) have shown that any random utility model can
be approximated by mixed logit.
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Since βi is not given (we can estimate b but can not observe ηi for each decision
maker), the (unconditional) choice probability is this logit formula integrated
over all values of βi
Pij =
∫
eVij(β)∑J
k=1 Vik(β)
f(β)dβ. (5)
Models of this form are called mixed logit because the choice probability is a
mixture of logits with f(β) as the mixing distribution.5 The mixing distribution
may be discrete or continuous. In the discrete case the mixed logit becomes the
so called latent class model.6 As most applications of mixed logit we assume
the density of β to be continuous and more specific to be normal with mean b
and covariance W . In this case the choice probability is given by
Pij =
∫
eVij(β)∑
k e
Vik(β)
φ(β|b,W )dβ, (6)
where φ(β|b,W ) is the normal density with mean b and covariance W . The
parameters to be estimated are those of the mixing distribution f(β), b and W .
Since there is no closed form expression for the choice probabilities in mixed
logit we approximate the probabilities by simulation and maximize the simulated
log-likelihood function. In particular for given b and W a value of β is drawn
from f(β|b,W ). This value is labeled βr with the superscript r=1 referring to
the first draw. Using this draw the standard logit formula Lij(βr) is calculated.
This process is repeated for many draws and the results are averaged. This
average is the simulated probability:
P̌ij =
1
R
R∑
r=1
Lij(βr), (7)
where R is the number of draws. P̌ij is an unbiased estimator of Pij . Its
variance decreases as R increases. The simulated probabilities are inserted into
the log-likelihood function to give a simulated log-likelihood:
SSL =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
dij lnP̌ij , (8)
where d is defined as above. The maximum simulated likelihood estimator is
the value of b and W that maximizes the simulated log likelihood.
5The standard logit model is a special case where f(β) is degenerate at fixed parameters
b: f(β) = 1 for β = b and 0 for β 6= b.
6In the latent class model β = bm with probability sM . The choice probability for this
model is given by
Pij =
MX
m=1
sm
eVij(bm)P
k e
Vik(bm)
.
Here it assumed that the population consists of M segments each with its own choice behavior
or preferences. The share of segment m in the population, sm, is estimated along with the
bm’s for each segment (see Bargain (2004) for a recent application to labour supply estimation.
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3 Specification of the Models
3.1 Structural Models of Labour Supply
We start with describing a static neo-classical structural labour supply model for
single decision makers. Following Keane and Moffitt (1998), Blundell, Duncan,
McCrae, and Meghir (2000) and (Van Soest, Das, and Gong 2002) we assume
that the answer to the desired hours question is based upon maximizing
Uij = V (Yij ,Hj ; Si, β) + εij , (9)
where Yij is net household income, Hj are female hours of work and Si are
household characteristics. The net household income Yij is given by
Yij = wiHj + Yim + Yinl − T (wiHj , Yim, Yinl;Si),
where wi is the female’s wage rate, Yim the husband’s labour income, Yinl is the
household’s non labour income and T (wiHj , Yim, Yinl; Si) are the tax payments.
As in Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) the utility function is
specified to be quadratic and is given by
Uij = βY Y Y 2ij + β
HHH2j + β
Y HYijHj + βY Yij + βHHj for j = 1, ...J. (10)
Observed heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that
βH = βh0 + β′hSi. (11)
In principle there is no theoretical reason to only allow βH to vary with S.
However the identification of the effects of S via different β’s is often difficult.
In addition βH is an attractive choice for interpreting the results. It implies
that the marginal utility of work varies linearly with S. The sign of the βh
coefficients directly determines if the variables in S have a positive (positive sign)
or a negative (negative sign) effect on the marginal utility of work. This basic
model will hereafter be referred to as model S1. It has two major shortcomings.
First, it does not fit the data, in the sense that it underpredicts nonparticipation
and overpredicts part-time jobs involving a few hours a week. Second, it does
not allow for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Several methods have been
used to overcome the first shortcoming. Van Soest (1995) introduced some
hours specific constants on an ad hoc basis in the utility function. These may
reflect costs of finding a part-time job. An alternative with a more attractive
economic interpretation is the incorporation of fixed costs of work (Callan and
Soest 1996).7 Fixed costs are the costs an individual has to pay to get to work.
By subtracting them from income for the strictly positive working hours they
can be introduced into the model in a natural way. For countries with very
high costs of childcare like Switzerland fixed costs of work are mainly made up
7Another alternative would be the approach of Dickens and Lundberg (1993), who incor-
porate demand-side restrictions on hours worked explicitly, but this model requires strong
assumptions for identification.
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by childcare costs. In principal it would therefore be preferable to proceed as
Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) and use sample information on
hourly prices of childcare to account for childcare expenditures. However data
on childcare costs for Switzerland are of a too poor quality. We therefore have
to define a fixed costs equation in terms of a set of observable variables. Fixed
costs are assumed to be not stochastic and are specified as
Fi = δ′Zi, (12)
where Zi is a subset of Si.8 For all states j > 0 utility expression 9 becomes
Uij = V (Yij − Fi,Hj ;Si, β) + εij . (13)
If utility increases with income, fixed costs decrease the utility of working com-
pared to the utility of not working, thereby increasing the probability of nonpar-
ticipation. This model will be referred to as model S2. The second shortcoming
can be removed by adding an error term to one of the parameters of the utility
function. We follow this strategy and assume that unobserved heterogeneity
enters through the parameter βY :9
βYi = βy0 + viy, (14)
where viy ∼ N(0, σ2viy ). The model with fixed costs of work and random pref-
erences will be referred to as model S3.
In contrast to the continuous labour supply model imposing quasi-concavity
of preferences a priori is not necessary for coherency of the model in discrete
choice analysis (Van Soest, Kapteyn, and Kooreman 1993). Quasi-concavity of
the utility function can be checked ex post. In this way the MaCurdy critique
that elasticities are largely determined a priori (through the quasi-concavity
restriction) can be avoided. In fact since only utility in the finite choice sets
matters quasi-concavity is not even necessary for economic interpretation of the
model. The only restriction required for economic interpretation is that utility is
increasing with income. This restriction we need since we assume that everyone
always chooses a point on the frontier of the budget set rather than in the
interior. However we will not impose this condition a priori before estimation
but check it ex post (Van Soest, Das, and Gong 2002).10 These considerations
are also valid for the more flexible models which follow in the next sections.
8We also experimented with stochastic fixed costs. However this did not help to improve
the fit of the model.
9This choice is driven by the fact that the structural models must be comparable with the
more flexible models where only the income terms remain in the utility function. However the
model was also estimated with unobserved heterogeneity entering through βH . The fit of the
model did not improve at all.
10Another restriction that can be checked ex post is the monotonicity restriction with respect
to labour supply. Interestingly the recent literature seems not very concerned about this
restriction (see for example Bargain (2004) or Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002)).
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3.2 More Flexible Models of Labour Supply
The improvements of model S1 through the introduction of fixed costs and ran-
dom coefficients are strategies to increase flexibility of structural models for a
better fit to the data. However the specification of preferences in these models
is still restrictive. Discrete choice labour supply would allow for more flexible
specifications since in contrast to continuous models discrete choice analytics
does not need explicit expressions for both the direct utility function and the
labour supply function (or the indirect utility or expenditure function).11 The
question is therefore if it is reasonable and possible to use more flexible specifica-
tions of preferences. We consider two recent contributions put forth by Bargain
(2004) and Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002) respectively which propose more
flexible models of labour supply.
3.2.1 A Structural Labour Supply Model with Nonparametric Pref-
erences
Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002) introduce a structural nonparametric labour
supply model (hereafter SNP model). Basically they replace the direct utility
function of the structural model S3 with a flexible polynomial expansion. In this
way they maintain the economic structure of model S3 (utility maximization
under a complex budget set) and combine it with a nonparametric specification
of the utility function. Since the general structure of this flexible model remains
unchanged it can be represented by expression 13:
Uij = V (Yij − Fi,Hj ;Si, β) + εij .
The direct utility function is specified as higher order polynomial in its argu-
ments H and Y:
Uij =
K∑
p=0
K−p∑
q=0
βY
pHqHp(Y − F )q. (15)
K is the order of the polynomial and determines the flexibility of the utility
function. Since for K equal to two we get the model discussed in the previous
section K has to be larger than two. If K is allowed to be arbitrarily large, Uij is
able to approximate any utility function in a given compact set of relevant hours
income combinations. However for finite sample size the order of the polynomial
that can be used is limited.12 In the empirical section we will consider the case
of K=5 the largest value of K Van Soest, Das and Gong used in their work. As
in the previous section observed and unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to
enter through the parameters βY and βH
βYi = βy0 + viy
βH = βh0 + β′hSi,
11See for example Creedy and Duncan (2002).
12Asymptotics requires that K tends to infinity much slower than the number of observa-
tions.
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where viy ∼ N(0, σ2viy ). Fixed costs are specified and introduced into the model
as before. An important comment can be made concerning the identification of
fixed costs. The identification of fixed costs can be intuitively explained by the
lack of observations with low working hours. In the case of a fully nonparametric
utility function it could be that the utility function itself could pick up the gap
in the distribution at low hours, by assigning lower utility to such hours values.
Fixed costs would then be nonparametrically unidentified (Van Soest, Das, and
Gong 2002). However since S enters the utility function and fixed costs in a
restrictive way this should not be a matter of concern here.
3.2.2 Unconstrained and Non-standard Models of Labour Supply
Bargain (2004) suggests two generalizations of model S3 which relax the re-
strictions on household preferences imposed in this model step by step. His
generalizations are more radical than the one from Van Soest, Das, and Gong
(2002). However despite their generality both models maintain a utility maxi-
mizing interpretation.
Unconstrained Model (Model U) In this model preference parameters are
alternative specific, that is utility can depend on consumption in a fully flexible
way across working hours. A direct interpretation of any of the parameters is
no more possible. The model which nests the structural models from section
3.1 is given by
Uij = V (Yij ; Si, βj) + εij , (16)
where Yi is given as before.13 Using the quadratic form the utility function for
this model has the form
Uij = βY Yj Y
2
ij + β
Y
j Yij + δj for j = 1, ...J. (17)
Observed and unobserved heterogeneity is written as
βYj = βy0j + β
′
yjSi + v (18)
δj = δ0j + δ′jSi +
L∑
k=1
L∑
l=k
δklj s
k
i s
l
i.
Only J − 1 sets of parameters δj can be identified. For the first alternative the
δ coefficients are therefore set to zero. Since disposable income is alternative
specific all J β coefficients can be estimated.
Non-standard or General Model (Model G) So far wage rates and non-
labour income influence labour choices only through disposable income. This is
consistent with the standard or unitary approach and implies income pooling
13See the appendix of Bargain (2004) for the identification of the constraints imposed by
model S3 on the unconstrained model
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and common preferences within a household. Bargain’s second generalization
allows each alternative to depend on disposable income as well as on wage rates
and non-labour income. In some sense then preferences are price- and income-
dependent. Such a non-standard model could have the following form:
Uij = V (Yij , wi, Yim, Yinl; Si, βj) + εij , (19)
where the variable definitions remain the same as above. Utility of alternative
j is now not only dependent on disposable income of the household but also on
female’s wage rate, the labour income of the husband and non-labour income.
This model can be rationalized in different ways. It can be related to the
collective approach (Chiappori 1988), it can be made consistent with the life
cycle framework and finally the model could reflect constraints from the demand
side.14 However the model does not allow to discriminate between these different
approaches. Keeping the quadratic form the utility function of the model could
be specified as
Uij = βY Yj Y
2
ij + β
Y
j Yij + β
ww
j w
2
i + β
YmYm
j Y
2
im + β
YnlYnl
j Y
2
inl (20)
+βwYmj wiYim + β
wYm
j wiYinl + β
YmYnl
j YimYinl + β
w
j wi + β
Ym
j Yim
+βYnlj Yinl + β
wY
j wiYij + β
YmY
j YimYij + β
YnlY
j YinlYij + δij
for j = 1, ...J
with:
βYj = βy0j + β
′
yjSi + v (21)
βRj = βr0j + β
′
rjSi for r = w, Ym, Ynl
δij = δ0j + δ
′
jSi +
L∑
k=1
L∑
l=k
δklj s
k
i s
l
i.
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data
The data used in this analysis are drawn from the Swiss Income and Expenditure
Survey 1998 (SIES). Over 9000 households participated in this survey conducted
by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics. The survey is primarily used for the
periodical revisions of the Swiss National Consumer Price Index. Besides the
detailed expenditure data including tax and social security payments the survey
also provides information about all sources of income as well as about labour
supply of each household member.
For our estimations and simulation exercises we need net incomes and hence
taxes for all hours alternatives. Unfortunately the tax system in Switzerland is
14Bargain (2004) provides a short explanation how the model could be made consistent with
the different approaches.
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rather complicated. The majority of taxes consists of cantonal and communal
taxes that vary considerably across cantons and communities. In other words
there are 26 different tax systems. Matters get further complicated by the fact
that within these 26 tax systems the communal tax rates vary as well. Given the
complexity of the tax system we use a simplified tax model. Instead of communal
tax factors we apply the tax factor of the canton’s capital to everyone living in
the respective canton. Cantonal and federal taxes are computed according to
the published tax tables. Communal taxes are the capital’s tax factor times
cantonal taxes.
For the empirical analysis we select married or de-facto couples, aged be-
tween 20 and 65, who are employed or voluntarily unemployed. Students, self
employed, unemployed or retired people are excluded from the sample. More-
over people who work more than 60 hours a week, households with more than
four children or with more than two decision makers are selected out. People
with very high levels of non-labour income and individuals with wages below or
above the 1st and 99th percentiles of the wage distribution were also discarded.
Since men’s participation rate is very high (99.8%) and almost all men work full
time the empirical analysis fully concentrates on female labour supply. Working
hours of men are fixed at the observed value. With this selection the sample
contains 2305 households. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the sample.
Since gross wage rates for non-working individuals are not observed these wages
are predicted using the standard Heckman two-step estimation procedure. For
workers the actual wage rates are used.15 Figure 1 displays the distributions of
predicted and observed wage rates for part-time and full-time female workers
respectively. The fit is more satisfying for full time workers than for part time
workers. In both cases the predicted wage distribution is more concentrated
around the mode. Figure 2 shows the distribution of female weekly working
hours. A significant portion of females in couples does not participate in the
labour market and the fraction of part-time working females is quite large. For
the empirical analysis we assume that women have the following discrete choice
set: H∈ {0, 8, 16, 25, 33, 42}.
4.2 Empirical Results
Table 2 displays the estimation results for the structural models S1, S2 and
S3. The interpretation of the parameters has to be made with caution. Di-
rectly interpretable are the interactions between hours worked and household
characteristics. These coefficients determine how marginal utility changes with
household characteristics. Age and the presence of children decrease marginal
utility of work. In the case of children the effect is stronger for preschool chil-
dren than for schoolaged children. High education increases the marginal utility
15We are aware of the fact that this approach in principle does not lead to consistent
estimators since it assumes that wage rates of nonworkers are predicted without errors. For
consistent estimators it would be necessary to take the wage rate prediction errors explicitly
into account for example by integrating out the disturbance term of the wage equation in the
likelihood (Van Soest 1995).
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of work. These results seem consistent with intuition and are in line with other
studies (see for example Duncan and Harris (2002).
Fixed costs of work significantly decrease with the number of children. This
counterintuitive result was also found by other studies (see for example Duncan
and Harris (2002) and Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002)). Combined with the
effect of children on preferences, this finding could mean that for women with
children, working a small number of hours per week is particularly attractive
(see Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002)). On the whole the fixed cost coefficients
are implausible high. Depending on the model average fixed costs represented
by the constant term are more than 100% of the average earnings of working
women. Since fixed costs are constant over hours alternatives utility of working
is particularly decreased for low working hours.16 This is reflected by the kink
in the estimated indifference curves in figure 3 at 8 hours of work per week.17
What exactly this coefficient measures is not clear. One possibility is that the
coefficient captures demand side aspects like insufficient availability of low hours
jobs. Considering these results the view that fixed costs are a structural way
to increase the flexibility of a model can be questioned. The interpretation
of the estimated coefficients as fixed costs of work seems rather ad hoc and
not very plausible. As an alternative to the explicit inclusion of fixed costs
we could allow the taste shifters S to enter utility in a less restrictive way.
The utility function would then represent preferences in which fixed costs are
already captured. Another possibility would be to collect data about fixed costs
of work. For Switzerland this would mean to collect data about hourly prices of
child care and child care usage and then proceed as Blundell, Duncan, McCrae,
and Meghir (2000).
The inclusion of random preferences seems to considerably improve the preci-
sion of the preference parameters and leads to quite a large increase of the hours
and fixed cost coefficients. Given the significantly estimated standard deviation
of the distribution of the random coefficient there seems to exist considerable
heterogeneity concerning income preferences.
The considerations just made about the interpretation of the parameters, in
particular what we said about implausible high fixed cost coefficients and de-
mand side contamination, remain also valid for the SNP model. The estimation
results for this model are displayed in table 3. Due to convergence problems this
model is estimated without individual heterogeneity. Given the large number
of parameters and the difficulty of interpretation the estimation results for the
U and G model are omitted.18 These models have been estimated with and
without random parameter. However in a likelihood ratio test the conditional
logit model (the model without unobserved preference heterogeneity) could not
be rejected. In the following comparison of the models we thus ignore individual
heterogeneity for the models SNP, U and G.
16We also tried to estimate a model with alternative specific fixed cost coefficients. However
the model was not identified in this case.
17The indifference curves are plotted for a benchmark individual: age 45, no children,
medium education level.
18Results available upon request from the author.
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Table 4 contains some information about the fit of the estimated models.
In the upper part of the table the observed frequencies are compared with
its average estimated value over all households. Not surprisingly the flexible
models SNP, U and G perform best in this respect. Interestingly predicted
probabilities of model S3 seem not to be much more accurate than those of
model S1. The relatively good performance of model S1 may be due to the
fact that in Switzerland female part-time work is widely spread and the pattern
of working hours is not as rigid as in other countries. Another measure of fit
displayed in table 4 is the pseudo-R2 or Likelihood Ratio Index of McFadden
(1973). The measure is defined as 1 − LogLe/LogL0, where LogLe is the log-
likelihood function for the estimated model and LogL0 is log-likelihood function
when all parameters are set to zero. The definition of the measure implies that
it is always between zero and one. According to this measure the general model
clearly provides a better fit than the standard models and the flexible standard
models dominate the simple structural model S1. Again this comes with no
surprise.
Table 5 displays the log-likelihood values for the models S3, SNP, U and G.
In addition it provides the LR statistics and the relevant critical values at the
1% significance level. Tests of model S3 against model SNP and U result in a
rejection of model S3 in both cases.19 This implies that from a statistical point of
view the restrictions in the structural model S3 are too restrictive. Furthermore
line three of table 5 shows that in a test of the U model versus the G model the
standard model is rejected. In a static setting, assuming partial equilibrium,
this is nothing else than a test of the unitary model against a model with
price-dependent preferences that does not verify Slutsky conditions or pooling
(Pollak 1977). Thus this is strong evidence against the unitary approach. So
far we agree with Bargain (2004).
As stated in section 3.1 the only coherency restriction we really need for the
economic interpretation of the models is that utility is monotonically increasing
in income. This restriction is satisfied for all observations and labour supply
choices in the models S1, S2, S3 and SNP. In the models U and G however
marginal utility of income is positive for only 87.3% and 52.9% of the labour
supply choices respectively. Thus the increased flexibility of model U and G
has the advantage of capturing broader preference heterogeneity but has the
disadvantage that a significant portion of the observations behave in contra-
diction to economic theory. For model U the problem of the violation of the
coherency restriction can be solved by a restricted estimation. Practically this
can be done by penalizing the log-likelihood for observations at which utility
of a corresponding interior point of the budget set exceeds utility of the point
on the edge. For model G this procedure seems not to make sense since the
percentage of observations with positive marginal utility of income is too low.
Re-estimating model U imposing the monotonicity restriction leads to a slightly
higher likelihood value than in the unrestricted model. The log-likelihood value
and the corresponding likelihood ratio are displayed on line four of table 5.
19Model SNP also yields a clearly higher AIC value than model S3.
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Despite the possibility of a restricted estimation we only use model S3 and
SNP for the simulation exercises. This is for several reasons: First, it is true that
economic theory does not impose the functional form of the utility function but
it is not obvious why the effect of income should differ over the supply choices
as in model U and G. Second, it is not clear why these different effects should
remain constant after a tax reform. Third, the number of parameters in model
G and U is very large and some of these are imprecisely estimated. Fourth,
the parameterization depends on the chosen discretization of the choice set.
The more discrete hours level are used the more parameters you get. Overall
model SNP seems to perform best. The model is flexible but has still a rich
economic structure, it fits the data well and all supply choices in our sample
exhibit positive marginal utility of income. Model S3 which can be seen as
the standard model in policy analysis serves as a benchmark in our simulation
exercises.
4.3 Elasticities
In this section we calculate aggregate wage elasticities of the two selected mod-
els. We define the wage elasticity of labour supply as the percentage change in
total working hours subsequent to a 1% increase of the before tax wage. The
tax system is left unaffected.
To compute elasticities we follow the approach suggested in Duncan and Weeks
(1998). This approach applies re-sampling methods to generate probabilistic
estimates of employment transitions. We start with a calibration step to place
individuals in their (pre-reform) observed discrete hours level. That is for each
household we draw a set of pseudo-residuals ε̂ij (j = 1, ..., J) together with in-
dividual unobserved heterogeneity terms and add them to the measured utility
in each of the hours points. If this results in the observed labour supply being
the optimal choice for the individual, the draw is accepted; otherwise another
draw is made and checked. The optimal choices after the wage increase are then
predicted by the estimated deterministic model plus the stochastic elements of
the model derived in the calibration step. This procedure is repeated 100 times.
In this way probabilities of being in each of the discrete hours points can be
obtained and expected average working hours after the wage increase can be
derived.
We calculated own wage elasticities as well as elasticities with respect to the
husband’s wage rate. Since apart from female earnings the husband’s earnings
reflect the bulk of family income these can be interpreted as other income elas-
ticities. The calculated elasticities take full account of the impact of the wage
rate on the participation decision. This is because utility of working increases
with the wage rate while the utility of not working is not affected by the wage
rate. The results for all women as well as separately for the low and high ed-
ucated are displayed in table 6. The calculated figures seem to be in line with
other studies see for example Bargain (2004) or Gerfin (1993). Studies which
allowed for measurement errors in the wage equation generally got larger elas-
ticities (see Van Soest, Das, and Gong (2002)). The effects on participation
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presented in Table 6 are the changes in percentage points if husband’s or own
wage rates increase by 1%. The cross wage impact on participation is not clear.
In the case of the own wage increase more than half of the elasticity is due to
an effect on participation.20
From a policy point of view the labour supply behaviour of low educated
women is of particular interest since their participation rates are much lower.
According to our findings the labour supply for the low educated women seems
to be somewhat more sensitive for own wages than for high educated women.
Contrary the labour supply for the high educated seems to be more sensitive
for husband’s wage. The two models give similar results.
4.4 Labour Supply Response to a Tax Reform
In Switzerland married couples are currently taxed jointly. Given the progressive
tax system this implies very high marginal tax rates for second earners and in
general discrimination in favour of de-facto couples.21 The problem is alleviated
to some extent by lower tax rates for couples but there is still a marriage penalty
with respect to income taxation. Of particular interest in our case are the
disincentive effects of the current tax system on second earners (in most cases
the woman). To asses the magnitude of these effects we simulate the female
labour supply responses to the introduction of an individual tax system. The
deductions are assumed to be the same as in the current system.
The way in which the effects of the reforms are predicted is very similar to the
method of computing the elasticities in section 4.3. We first place individuals
in their (pre-reform) observed discrete hours level using the actual tax rules
and the random draws. We then predict optimal after reform choices using the
tax rules according to the proposed reform and the stochastic elements of the
model drawn in the first step. To take into account the probabilistic nature of
the state transitions at the individual level the procedure is repeated 100 times.
We assume that before tax wage rates are not changed by the reforms. In other
words general equilibrium effects are not taken into account. The calculated
effects are first order effects which could principally serve as inputs for a general
equilibrium model.
Results are displayed in table 7-9. Table 9 displays the effects of the reform
on average working hours and participation. Both models predict an increase
in the participation rate and in average hours worked. The effects seem to be
much stronger for the low educated than for high educated woman. Table 7-
8 show transition frequencies for model S3 and model SNP respectively. The
net proportion of women who would potentially take up a part-time job is
approximately 1.36% and 1.55% respectively. 0.67% (0.49%) would move from
non-work to full-employment and 0.2% (0.4%) would move from part-time to
full employment. Disincentive effects are negligible. Again the two models give
similar results.
20The elasticities of participation can be obtained by dividing the change in participation
(in % points) by the predicted participation rates.
21In the case of single earner couples the discrimination is in favour of married couples.
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5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes different modeling strategies for discrete choice labour sup-
ply models. The main result suggests that care should be taken when using
very general functional forms of preferences in discrete choice labour supply
analytics.
We compared four modeling strategies used in recent studies: a structural
model with fixed costs of work and random heterogeneity, a model with a non-
parametric specification of the direct utility function, a model which allows
parameters to be fully alternative specific and a model that allows for price and
income dependent preferences.
Some of the estimated parameters of the structural and the structural non-
parametric model are directly interpretable. However as the implausible high
coefficients of the fixed cost variables indicate the interpretation should be done
very cautiously. What these coefficients exactly measure is unclear. Apart from
fixed cost it could also be job search disutility, distaste of work or a mixture of
all these. If available it seems preferable to use sample information about child
care costs to account for fixed costs instead of using a shadow equation as we
had to. Another alternative would be to allow the taste shifters to enter utility
in a less restrictive way so that the utility function would represent preferences
in which fixed costs are already captured.
A series of likelihood ratio tests show that the restrictions made in the struc-
tural model are clearly rejected. In other words the structural nonparametric
model as well as the unconstrained and the non-standard models are statisti-
cally superior to the structural model. Moreover estimation of the model with
price and income dependent preferences lead to a clear rejection of the standard
or unitary models. However the unconstrained and non-standard model cause
a significant part of the sample to not respect the only coherency restriction
we really need for economic interpretation of the models and meaningful policy
simulation: positive monotonicity in income. In the case of the non-standard
model only 52.9% of the supply choices exhibit positive marginal utility of in-
come. Improving results by a restricted estimation seems not to make sense
here.
Overall the structural nonparametric model performs best. The model fits
the data well and all supply choices exhibit positive marginal utility of income.
In addition from an intuitive point of view it is not obvious why the effect of
income should differ over the supply choices as in the unconstrained and non-
standard model. Furthermore it is not clear if these effects remain constant
after the introduction of a tax reform.
The simulation of female labour supply responses to an introduction of in-
dividual taxation in Switzerland with the structural and the structural non-
parametric model give clear results. Depending on the model the effects on the
participation rate and average hours worked are 4.93% (3.93) and 2.03% points
(2.05) respectively. The effects seem to be much stronger for the low educated
than for high educated woman.
Future research needs to go a step further and has to address the introduc-
tion of more general frameworks like the collective or the life cycle approach.
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Another general approach we did not mention in our paper would consist of the
disaggregation of what we call leisure into a number of different categories of
time allocation (Apps and Rees 1996). The few work which has been done in
these fields has shown that ignoring these approaches can lead to biased labour
supply estimates. Extending the discrete choice framework in these directions
could therefore be a promising direction of future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Women Men
Participation rate 0.656 0.998
Hours of work (all) 17.207 41.33
Hours of work (H>0) 26.232 41.384
Gross wage rate (all)∗ 29.694 38.664
Gross wage rate (H> 0) 30.556 38.668
Age 36.825 39.272
High education 0.097 0.333
Low education 0.085 0.039
Net household income (per month) 7801.89
Number of children 1.133
Number of preschool children 0.571
Number of schoolaged children 0.384
Number of selected households 2305
∗ Includes predicted wages for non-workers
Figure 1: Predicted and observed wage distribution
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Figure 2: Distribution of female working hours
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Table 3: Estimation Results, Model SNP
Variable Coeff. (Std. Err.)
income5 -0.0163 (0.0200)
income4 × hours -0.0111 (0.0214)
income3 × hours2 0.0031 (0.0345)
income2 × hours3 0.0544 (0.0438)
income × hours4 0.1426∗ (0.0598)
hours5 0.1627∗ (0.0822)
income4 0.1007 (0.1588)
income3 × hours -0.0349 (0.1742)
income2 × hours2 -0.4016 (0.3265)
income × hours3 -1.3845∗ (0.5434)
hours4 -1.8678∗ (0.8973)
income3 0.0427 (0.3601)
income2 × hours 1.0363 (0.7652)
income × hours2 4.4331∗ (1.7332)
hours3 8.1155∗ (3.5876)
income2 -1.3189∗ (0.6565)
hours2 -16.7405∗ (6.6290)
income × hours -5.5376∗ (2.31059
income 5.1526∗∗ (1.9258)
hours 16.2452∗∗ (5.6817)
× age−40 -0.0298∗∗ (0.0022)
× age2 − 40 0.0001 (0.0002)
× preschool children -0.8926∗∗ (0.0485)
× schoolaged children -0.6339∗∗ (0.0501)
× high educated 0.3897∗∗ (0.0661)
fixedcost/4000 2.0901∗ (0.9056)
preschool children -0.1002∗∗ (0.0348)
schoolaged children -0.2456∗∗ (0.0487)
N 2305
Log-likelihood -3030.80
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Table 4: Average Predicted Probabilities
choice actual S1 S2 S3 SNP U G
0 0.344 0.332 0.348 0.354 0.344 0.344 0.344
8 0.119 0.152 0.126 0.117 0.119 0.119 0.119
16 0.116 0.099 0.097 0.097 0.117 0.116 0.116
25 0.118 0.090 0.100 0.102 0.119 0.118 0.118
33 0.081 0.115 0.128 0.129 0.081 0.081 0.081
42 0.222 0.212 0.202 0.200 0.220 0.222 0.222
Pseudo R2 0.243 0.252 0.254 0.266 0.296 0.411
Table 5: Tests of Restrictions
mod. log L coeff. vs mod. log L coeff. df LR chi2(1%)
S3 -3127.64 14 SNP -3030.80 28 14 99.26 29.14
S3 -3127.64 14 U -2909.42 137 123 436.44 162.4
S3 -3127.64 14 UR -2910.01 137 123 435.26 162.4
U -2909.42 137 G -2432.35 275 138 954.16 179.56
Table 6: Changes in participation and elasticities of hours worked
husband’s wage own wage
change in elasticity of change in elasticity of
model participation hrs worked participation hrs worked
(in %-points) (in %) (in %-points) (in%)
S3
all 0.037 -0.078 0.151 0.309
low educated 0.078 0.096 0.216 0.734
high educated 0.009 -0.094 0.027 0.04
SNP
all -0.02 -0.208 0.133 0.237
low educated 0.036 -0.202 0.165 0.382
high educated -0.067 -0.226 0.117 0.236
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Table 7: Responses to the introduction of individual taxation, model S3
pre-reform post-reform
out of work part time full time marginal freq
out of work 32.36 (94.06) 1.37 (3.98) 0.67 (1.96) 34.4
part time 0.01 (0.02) 42.93 (98.84) 0.5 (1.14) 43.43
full time 0 (0) 0.03 (0.14) 22.14 (99.86) 22.17
marginal freq. 32.37 44.32 23.31 100
Table 8: Responses to the introduction of individual taxation, model SNP
pre-reform post-reform
out of work part time full time marginal freq
out of work 32.35 (94.05) 1.55 (4.52) 0.49 (1.43) 34.4
part time 0 (0) 43.02 (99.06) 0.41 (0.94) 43.43
full time 0 (0) 0.01 (0.06) 22.16 (99.94) 22.17
marginal freq. 32.36 44.58 23.06 100
Table 9: Policy effects, individual tax system and splitting model
individual tax system
change in change in
model participation hrs worked
(in %-points) (in %)
S3
all 2.03 4.932
low educated 3.293 11.664
high educated 0.3 1.022
SNP
all 2.045 3.918
low educated 3.098 8.883
high educated 0.924 1.965
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